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THE DUTY TO PREVENT HANDICAPS: LAWS 

PROMOTING THE PREVENTION OF 

HANDICAPS TO NEWBORNS 

JEFFREY A. PARNESS· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Lawmakers addressing the problem of legal rights of the handi­
capped traditionally have tended to focus on the legal rights afforded 
those persons already possessing certain physical or mental handi­
caps} Specifically, their focus has usually centered on either the 
rights of the handicapped to compensation, or their rights related to 
opportunities in employment, rehabilitation, or mobility.2 Commen­
tators have paid little attention to the legal rights, if any, that may be 
afforded those not yet handicapped, or to legal rights designed to 
prevent future handicaps. This failure is unfortunate because social 
policy favors the avoidance or elimination- of handicaps wherever 
possible.3 
• Associate Professor of Law. Northern Illinois University. "B.A.. Colby College; 
J.D .. University of Chicago. 
\. See, e.g .. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 250 (West 1979) (intent oflegislature 
to provide for the necessary medical serVices required by physically handicapped chil­
dren whose parents are unable to pay for these services); id. § 341 (West Supp. 1982) 
(program of medical care and social support services for persons with handicapping con­
ditions). Of course. through tort recovery and by other means, laws allow the handi­
capped to obtain compensation for handicaps from those who caused such handicaps. 
2. See, e.g., 20 U.S.c. § 1405 (Supp. V 1981) (promoting employment of the handi­
capped); id. § 1406 (West 1976 & Supp. V 1981) (promoting mobility of the handi­
capped), § 1412(1) (West 1976 & Supp. V 1981) (promoting education of the 
handicapped); 29 U.S.c. § 720 (West 1976 & Supp. V 1981) (promoting preparation of 
the handicapped for employment); Id. "§ 793 (promoting employment of the handi­
capped). At times. laws do seek to prevent handicaps. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§ 309 (West Supp. 1982) (policy of state to detect as early as possible preventable herita­
ble disorders); Id. § 429.11 (West 1979) (program of occupational health and occupa­
tional disease prevention); id. § 321.2 (West Supp. 1982) (child health and disability 
prevention program). 
3. 42 U.S.c.A. § 701(a)(2) (West Supp. 1975-1981) (authorization of appropria­
tions for states to reduce "the incidence of preventable diseases and handicapping condi­
tions among children"); 42 U.S.c. § 241(a) (Supp. IV 1980) (mandating that the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services promote research relating to the prevention of 
physical and mental diseases and impairments of man); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§ 150(c) (West 1979) (state policy to alleviate or cure hereditary disorders); id. § 309 
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This lack of commentary on the propriety of laws designed to 
prevent handicaps is particularly troublesome. Recent scientific ad­
vances have increased the understanding of the causes and preven­
tion of many forms of physical and mental handicaps.4 Many of 
these advances involve handicaps that can be projected or discov­
ered prior to birth,5 the prevention of which can be furthered by le­
gal regulation of the various stages of life, or potential life, prior to 
live birth. While undoubtedly there has been tremendous growth in 
the legal rights of a handicapped infant through compensation from 
those responsible for the handicaps, and through other opportunities 
for a meaningful future life, further legal regulation is needed to pre­
vent those handicaps which are reasonably certain to occur. Com­
pensation for handicaps is not only less desirable than their 
prevention, but in many cases compensation is not presently avail­
able for preventable handicaps. 
In focusing on the means by which laws can prevent handicaps 
for future generations, at least four distinct inquiries should be 
made. First, attention must be paid to the type of conduct that can 
be subjected to legal regulation, that is, what constitutes unreasona­
ble conduct or perhaps reasonable but unwarranted conduct toward 
the unborn? Second, note must be taken of the people who can be 
subjected to legal regulation, that is, who can be made legally re­
sponsible for their conduct toward the unborn? Third, consideration 
must be given to the appropriate type of legal regulator, that is, who 
can be made responsible for setting the standards of legally accepta­
ble conduct toward the unborn? Fourth, inquiry must be pursued on 
the possible sanctions available for the violations of any legal regula­
(West Supp. 1982) (state policy supponing early detection of preventable heritable disor­
ders leading to mental retardation or physical defects); Id. § 428 (West 1979) (state pro­
gram for the prevention of blindness); MD. PUB. HEALTH CODE ANN. § 13-\02 (\982) 
(state policy to alleviate or cure hereditary disorders). 
4. With these advances have come both legal change and legal commentary. On 
advances in genetics. see P. REILLY. GENETICS. LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977); Rogers. 
Wrongful Life and Wrongful Binh: Medical Malpractice in Genetic Counseling and Prena­
tal Testing. 33 S.c.L. REV. 713 (1982); Waltz & Thigpen. Genetic Screening and Counsel­
ing: The Legal and Ethical Issues. 68 Nw. V.L. REV. 696 (1973). 
5. For repons of recent surgeries on fetuses. see Medicine-Surgery in the Womb: 
Operating on the Fetus to head off birth defects. TIME, Aug. 10, 1981. at 59 (Calif. 
hydronephroses and hydorcephalus cases); Surge':F on fetus. AKRON BEACON J.. May II. 
1982, at A 7 (Connecticut case involving massively bloated kidney); Surgerl' on fetus offers 
new hope, AKRON BEACON J., March II, 1982, at A 7; 24- week-old fetus survives surgery 
out of the womb. AKRON BEACON J .. Nov. 15, 1981. at GI (each case involving out of 
womb surgery on fetus, which was later returned to the womb). 
433 
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tions, that is, what happens to those who act irresponsibly toward the 
unborn? 
These inquiries should not be foreclosed or delayed because re­
cent scientific advances provide less than definitive conclusions re­
garding the causes and means of preventing handicaps. While 
preliminary or tentative scientific findings counsel caution in the im­
plementation of legal standards, there is currently much that can be 
done to prevent the "costly and tragic and sometimes deadly burdens 
to the health and well-being"6 of the citizenry prompted by the birth 
of handicapped newborns. As scientific and medical advances pro­
duce more definitive conclusions, the inquiries should quickly be 
made and legal action therefrom should promptly be implemented. 
There looms the prospect of unprecedented harm if the traditional 
lag or delay between scientific advance and legal change is 
tolerated.7 
II. 	 CONTEMPORARY SCIENTIFIC AND MEDICAL UNDERSTANDING 
OF PREVENTING HANDICAPS TO NEWBORNS 
The past few years have brought significant advances to our un­
derstanding of the causes and the prevention of many handicaps of 
the newborn. This understanding encompasses the various stages of 
a newborn's potential life including: preconception; postconception, 
but previability; post concept ion and postviability, but prebirth; and 
birthing. It also encompasses the various people responsible for the 
newborn's birth, including the mother, the father, and the attending 
medical personnel. Additionally, it encompasses the varying physi­
cal as well as mental handicaps afflicting newborns. An awareness 
of this understanding of handicaps can be gleaned not only from 
contemporary medical texts and journals, many of which are incom­
prehensible to most of us, but also from legal developments during 
the last two decades, which are at times more comprehensible. 
During the preconception stage, the potentiality of handicaps 
for those subsequently born alive may be triggered by maternal, pa­
ternal, or parental acts. Thus, in Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Labo­
6. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § ISO(b) (West 1979); MD. PUB. HEALTH CODE 
ANN. § 13-102(2) (1982). 
7. "Where one pan of culture changes first through some discovery or in­
vention, and occasions changes in some pan of culture dependent upon It, there 
frequently is a delay .... The extent of this lag will vary ... but may exist 
for ... years, during which time there may be said to be a maladjustment." 
Note, The ConSlliuliona/ily ofMandalory Genelic Screening Sialules, 31 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 897,901 n.28 (1981) (quoting W. OGBURN, SOCIAL CHANGE WITH RESPECT TO 
CULTURE AND ORIGINAL NATURE 201 (1922». 
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ratories, Inc .,8 a woman's use of an oral contraceptive product was 
alleged to have caused the mongoloid condition of the woman's sub­
sequently conceived and born twin daughters,9 Similarly it was re­
cently reported that litigation was being readied on a claim against 
an employer whose male employees' exposure to defoliant chemicals 
caused hip defects in the employees' offspring.lo Finally, certain 
criminal incest laws prohibit sexual conduct between certain pro­
spective parents on the sole ground that their offspring are likely to 
be born with congenital malformations. I I Non-parental acts can 
also trigger the potentiality of handicaps for those as yet conceived. 
Thus, in Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital,12 a hospital and its director 
. of laboratories were alleged to have caused permanent damage to 
the brain and the central nervous system of a newborn by negligently 
transfusing the newborn's mother with incompatible blood nine 
years earlier.13 In Bergstreser l'. lUitchell, 14 a hospital and its physi­
cians were alleged to have caused brain damage to a newborn as the 
result of a negligently performed caesarean section on its mother 
during a pregnancy approximately two and a half years earlier. 15 
During pregnancy, the potentiality of handicaps may be trig­
gered by a variety of acts by any number of differing actors. In hun­
dreds of lawsuits filed during the last decade, a mother's ingestion of 
8. 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973). 
9. Jd. at 238. 240 n.3. 
10. Marcus, Firsl Work·Hazard SUil Ol'er Genelic Risk 10 Men. NAT'l L.J. March 
2. 1981. at 4. For similar recent cases. see Williams. Firing lhe Woman 10 ProreCl lhe 
Fetus: The Reconciliation of Felal Protection with Employment OpportUnl~I" Goals Under 
Title VlI. 69 GEO. L.J. 641. 664 n.154 (1981) (cases involving Agent Orange. DBCP'and 
atomic bomb radiation). 
II. See, e.g .. Ill. ANN. STAT. ch. 38. § 11-10 (Smith-Hurd 1979) (defining aggra· 
vated incest as "sexual intercourse" between any male and his "blood daughter" or be­
tween any female and her "blood son", regardless of age). Thus prosecutions can occur 
in Illinois even when the daughter or son is "sufficiently mature and autonomous to be 
free from undue parental pressure to submit to sexual advances." Id. (committee com· 
ments). In such prosecutions, biological risks to the potential offspring serve as the only 
legitimate state interest. Id. § 11·11 (committee comments) (noting the biological risks); 
Del'elopments in the Law. The Constitution and The Faml{r, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1156. 1268­
69 (1980) (indicating the impropriety of basing incest laws on the desire to promote tradi­
tion ). 
On the likelihood of congenital malformations in the offspring of those with con­
sanguineal relations. see Bailey & McCabe. Reforming the Law of Incest. 1979 CRIM. L. 
REV. 749. 757-58; Developmenls in the Law, The Conslilution and The Fami/I', 93 HARV. 
L. REV. 1156. 1246-65 (1980). 
12. 67 III. 2d 348. 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977). 
13. Jd. at 349-50. 367 N .E.2d at 1251. 
14. 577 F.2d 22. 24 (8th Cir. 1978). 
15. Id. at 24. 
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a prescription drug known as diethylstilbestrol (DES) during preg­
nancy was alleged to have caused birth defects in later-born chil­
dren. 16 Similarly, suits involving birth defects caused by the earlier 
negligence of an automobile driver involved in an accident with a 
pregnant woman are now commonplace. 17 Other pregnancy stage 
acts that have been linked in litigation to birth defects include irradi­
ation,18 exposure to lead,19 and heroin addiction.20 
During the birthing process, a variety of acts can trigger the po­
tentiality of handicaps at birth, though the possible actors are typi­
cally limited to those medical personnel responsible for facilitating 
delivery. In Libby v. Conway,21 damages were awarded for serious 
brain damage to a newborn resulting when the attending physician, 
nurses, and anesthetist negligently pushed with considerable force on 
the mother's stomach during delivery.22 In Larrabee v. United 
Stales,23 a physician was held liable for a newborn's blindness re­
sulting from a negligent use of forceps in delivery.24 Similarly, in 
Norland v. Washington General Hospilal,25 an obstetrician was found 
responsible for causing quadriplegia by applying excessive force in 
effecting emergence of the head during a breech delivery.26 
Legal developments demonstrating an awareness of scientific 
and medical advances in the understanding of human handicaps at 
birth extend beyond circumstances wherein defendants are charged 
with triggering the potentiality of human handicaps prior to birth. 
These developments embody responses to advances in the capability 
of predicting handicaps. For example, these advances have 
prompted discussions in recent years regarding significant extensions 
of the legal duty to convey certain correct information to a prospec­
16. Champion. DES and Liligalion: The Firsl Ten Years. 2 THE REVIEW OF LITI­
GATlON 171 (1982). 
17. An early case is Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch. 197 Md. 417. 79 A.2d 550 (1951). 
For a compilation of cases. see Annot.. 40 A.L.R. 3d 1222 (\ 971). 
18. Salinetro v. Nystrom, 341 So. 2d 1059, 1060 (Fla. Dis!. Ct. App. 1977). For a 
cri ticism of this decision. see Perd ue. AnAna(J'sis ofthe Ph. ,"sidan 's Professional Liablliry 
for Radialion of the Fe/us. 18 Hous. L. REV. 801. 812-13 (198\) (suggesting a burden 
upon a physician, nota potentially pregnant patient, to make an analysis of the possibil­
ity of pregnancy before suggesting x-rays). 
19. Williams. supra note 10, at 641. 
20. Reyes v. Superior Coun, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214. 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (\977). 
21. 192 Cal. App. 2d 865, 13 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1961). 
22. Id. at 869-70. 13 Cal. Rptr. at 833. 
23. 254 F. Supp. 613 (S.D. Cal. 1966). 

24.ld.at614.617. 

25. 461 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1972). 
26. Id. at 696. 699. 
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tive parent or parents, relating to them the probability that their fu­
ture offspring may be born with physical or mental handicaps.27 The 
court in Turpin v. Sortini held that this duty would most often be 
owed by those possessing no responsibility for any possible hand i­
caps.28 The duty to inform encompasses situations in which the pro­
spective parent or parents seek information and counsel, and their 
request is followed by such acts as a negligent misrepresentation,29 
an omission of fact,30 or fraud. 31 This duty can arise either before32 
or after33 conception. Of course, although the duty is imposed pri­
marily to promote informed decisionmaking regarding childbearing, 
breach of the duty often leads to the birth of a handicapped newborn 
who otherwise would not have been born.34 Thus, increased recog­
27. This information can be used in a number of settings. for example. during 
determinations on whether to bear or beget children and during determinations on 
whether medical treatment should be sought for children prior to their birth. Turpin v. 
Sortini. 643 P.2d 954. 961 n.8, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 344 n.8 (1982). This information can 
be directly related, as well, to the chances for handicaps or simply be information by 
which the chances for handicaps can be learned. Compare Becker v. Schwartz. 46 
N.Y.2d 401. 386 N.E.2d 807,413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) (prior to conceiving a second child. 
the parents were incorrectly informed that their first child's disease did not result in in­
creased chances that a subsequent baby would be similarly diseased) wilh Turpin v. Sor­
tini,643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982) (prior to conceiving a second child, parents 
were incorrectly informed that their first child did not have a hereditary ailment impair­
ing her hearing). 
28. 643 P.2d 954, 961 n.8, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 344 n.8 (1982). 
29. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401,386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978). 
30. Williams, supra note 10. 
31. Does one prospective parent have a duty to be truthful to another prospective 
parent about his or her genetic load or other deficiencies likely to result in handicapped 
offspring? Consider the recent suit by a disgruntled lover involving deception regarding 
the partner's affliction with herpes. Chicago Sun-Times, Mar. 6. 1983. (Living). at 3. col. 
I; Will, New Law 0/Sexual ResponsibililY? id.• Feb. 25, 1983, at 35. col. I. See also Piper 
v. Hoard, 107 N.Y. 73, 13 N.E. 626 (1887) (male fraudulently represented to female prior 
to their marriage his ownership of land and its availability to any subsequently born 
child). 
32. Supra note 27; Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). 
33. Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77,439 A.2d 110 (1981) (after performing unsuc­
cessful abortion on woman who feared having her third child with inherited disease, 
gynecologist persistently assured woman she was not pregnant; the result was the prema­
ture birth of a child with neurofibromatosis); Naccash v. Burger, 223 Va. 406, 290 S.E.2d 
825 (1982) (after testing the father, doctor erroneously assured parents that their previ­
able fetus would not be afflicted with Tay-Sachs disease). 
34. Becker v. Schwartz. 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) 
(failure to advise pregnant woman of increased risk of Down's Syndrome and the availa­
bility of amniocentesis led to decision to bear child); Turpin. 643 P.2d at 954. 182 Cal. 
Rptr. at 337 (failure to advise parents that their first child was "stone deaf' led to the 
conception and birth of a second child); Naccash v. Burger, 223 Va. 406. 290 S.E.2d 825 
(1982) (erroneous Tay-Sachs report on father led mother to decide to continue pregnancy 
and bear a child). While duty and breach of duty often are easily established, the meas­
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nition of and respect for a duty to inform would inevitably lead to 
fewer handicapped newborns. This may be said to constitute a sec­
ond form of handicap prevention.35 
While the foregoing review illustrates the manner in which the 
law has adapted to increased understanding of birth defects, it is by 
no meansexhaustive.36 More importantly, many scientific and med­
ical developments have as yet neither influenced legal standards, nor 
sufficiently matured to the point that legal change would be appro­
priate. Undoubtedly, during the next few years there will be further 
influence and further maturation. Why then is there the concern 
with future legal reaction to any increased scientific and medical un­
derstanding, since one could suggest that, to date, the "maladjust­
ment" caused by the time lag between medical-scientific advances 
and the law has not been unusual.37 The answer is simple and lies in 
the prospect of unprecedented harm that could have been prevented 
had the law reacted more swiftly. To date, lawmakers generally 
have left for another day difficult questions regarding claims such as 
those involving genetic damages done to successive generations of 
people as a result of a nuclear accident, or perpetual claims arising 
from a chemical accident or long-term radiation exposure.38 While 
lawmakers, in conjunction with scientists and others, certainly are 
ure of damages to prospective parents remains quite controversial, Wilczynski v. Good­
man, 73 111. App. 3d51, 58-63, 391 N.E.2d 479, 485-88 (1979) (reviewing recent cases), as 
do the questions of whether the handicapped newborn possesses her own cause of action, 
Turpin; 643 P.2d at 957-61, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 340-44 (reviewing recent cases), and the 
nature of the newborn's damage recovery should a duty to the newborn also be deemed 
breached, Turpin, 643 P.2d at 961-66, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 344-49 (reviewing recent cases). 
35. Just how far the right to decide about childbearing extends is not yet known, 
and so also unknown is the breadth ofinfonnation regarding childbearing which must be 
conveyed to prospective parents. Note, Sex Selection Abortion: A Constitulional Analysis 
ofthe Abortion Liberty and a Person's Right to Know, 56 IND. LJ. 281 (1981) (suggesting 
that a woman does not have the right to abort for whatever reason she alone chooses, that 
a state could prohibit sex selection amniocentesis, and that a state could thus prevent a 
woman from discovering the sex of the fetus she carries). 
36. Besides creating responsibilities for those who trigger the potentiality of handi­
caps prior to birth and for those who inadequately convey infonnation to prospective 
parents, the law could promote nonparental conduct protective of the unborn. Consider, 
for example, employer's fetal protection policies which seek to prevent handicaps to em­
ployee's offspring, often over the employee's objections. Doerr v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 
484 F. Supp. 320 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (employer's policy precluding female employees of 
childbearing capacity access to work environments entailing exposure to chemical vinyl 
chloride challenged by employees); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Olin, 24 
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1646, 1658, 1664 (W.D.N.C. 1980) (similar employer policy 
found nondiscriminatory under Title VII); Christman v. American Cyanamid Co., 92 
F.R.D. 441 (N.D.W. Va. 1981). 
37. Note, supra note 7. 
38. Renslow,67 Ill. 2d at 358, 367 N.E.2d at 1255. 
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not competent to foreclose all future harm, clearly more can now be 
done. 
III. 	 CONTEMPORARY LAWS ON PREVENTING HANDICAPS 
TO NEWBORNS 
To date, laws promoting the prevention of handicaps to 
newborns have been indirect in that their central purpose usually 
rests upon such other, albeit legitimate, grounds such as compensa­
tion for and deterrence of socially undesirable conduct. Often, these 
grounds are promoted in tort and criminal law. Thus, where a pre­
ventable handicap is not avoided due to the negligence of a physi­
cian, compensation can be recovered in a tort action for the resulting 
handicap.39 Where a physical condition suggesting a potential hand­
icap is not eliminated due to the negligence of a physician, again, 
compensation under tort law is available for the resulting handi­
cap.40 Finally, criminal sanctions are often imposed on those whose 
conduct causes a newborn to be afflicted with either mental or physi­
cal handicaps, although the affliction is not a requisite for the impo­
sition of sanctions.41 
As well, laws promoting the avoidance and elimination of 
handicaps to newborns have been incoherent and only occasionally 
further such underlying purposes as compensation and deterrence. 
For example, where a preventable handicap is not avoided or elimi­
nated due to negligence, compensation may only be forthcoming if 
the negligent act occurred after conception.42 In addition, precon­
ception or pre-birth conduct resulting in a newborn's handicap may 
not be subject to criminal sanction, despite the fact that similar con­
duct involving a born person would trigger possible criminal 
39. The legal parameters of such compensation are often unclear. See supra note 
34. 
40. Renslow, 67 Ill. 2d at 350, 357, 367 N.E.2d at 1251. 1255 (in pan. defendant 
responsible for not notifying woman that she had been administered incompatible blood 
which could result in handicaps to future offspring, where the coun referred to scientific 
techniques which can mitigate or alleviate a child's prenatal harm): Turpin. 643 P.2d at 
961 n.8, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 344 n.8. 
41. See, e.g .. Reyes v. Superior Coun, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 
(1977) (heroin use during last two months of pregnancy, despite public health nurse's 
warning, led to twin boys' heroin addiction and to a finding that the felony child endan­
gering statute was not violated). 
42. Albala v. City of New York, 54 N.Y.2d 269. 429 N.E.2d 786. 445 N.Y.S.2d 108 
(1981) (ton committed against the mother of a child not yet conceived does not give rise 
to a cause of action in favor of the child even if that ton caused injury to the child during 
gestation. resulting in the child's being born with a damaged brain). 
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proceedings.43 
Prevention of handicaps to newborns could easily be more fully 
promoted by making compensation and deterrence laws more direct 
and more coherent. Tort law should generally recognize, for exam­
ple, a duty to prevent handicaps owed to the unborn by.those having 
contact with the prospective parent or parents. Thus, where a physi­
cian's treatment of a woman results in her giving birth to a child with 
a preventable handicap, it should be found that the physician 
breached a duty owed to the newborn-regardless of any duty owed 
or breached to the woman. Similarly, criminal law should recognize 
more often than it does now, for example, that one not yet born can 
be the victim of crime. Thus, an assault causing only minor injury to 
a pregnant woman but resulting in the death of her fetus, should be 
prosecutable as a form of homicide. 
Even if laws aimed at compensation and deterrence were more 
comprehensive, they would still generally operate only after the on­
set of handicaps, when the link between individual conduct and re­
sulting handicaps could be clearly established within a reasonable 
period of time. These laws are not used: (I) To secure equitable 
relief prior to the onset of handicaps;44 (2) to address non-individual­
ized conduct such as industry-wide practices of various corporations 
within an enterprise where no single entity can be proven responsi­
ble for particular handicaps;45 (3) to cover conduct which is some­
what far removed in time, but not in actual causal link, from 
handicaps;46 or (4) to encompass activity which may lead to signifi­
43. See, e.g., Reyes v. Superior Coun, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 
(1977). 
44. Among other problems, a panicular couple may be unable to foresee that cer­
tain cond uct will lead to the onset of handicaps for their future offspring, though govern­
mental officials could foresee that a cenain number of handicaps would occur if such 
conduct gener:JI' continued. As well, even if the onset of panicular handicaps was fore­
seeable, equitable relief may be barred for there are not facts supponing irreparable 
harm or the legal remedies available subsequent to the onset of handicaps might be 
deemed adequate. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Lennen, 640 F.2d 255, 259 
(10th Cir. 1981) (traditional equitable requirements only unnecessary in a suit to enjoin 
prohibited conduct where statute expressly establishes lesser requirements). 
45. Consider recent litigation involving pregnant women's use of DES where there 
has been an inability of many claimants to prove which company manufactured the drug 
used. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 
cerl. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Payton v. Abbott Laboratories, 386 Mass. 540, 437 
N.E.2d 171 (1982). For an attempt to help claimants pursue funher information on DES, 
see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 349 (West Supp. 1982) (establishment of a public 
and professional information campaign on DES). 
46. The problem of defending stale claims may render inapplicable laws otherwise 
relevant. Renslow, 67 Ill. 2d at 358,369-70,372,367 N.E.2d at 1255, 1261. 1262. 
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cant handicaps for many, but which is not definitively linked by 
scientists to the onset of such handicaps.47 It can thus be said that 
laws promoting the avoidance and elimination of handicaps to 
newborns are inadequate and that legal change beyond the bounds 
of tort and criminal law is in order. 
Recently, some encouraging signs have emerged, indicating that 
lawmakers recognize existing compensation and deterrence-based 
rules as an inadequate means of promoting the prevention of handi­
caps to newborns. As further scientific and medical advances are 
made regarding the prevention of handicaps, early legal develop­
ments in the creation of a legal duty to prevent handicaps will pro­
vide a foundation upon which future laws can be fashioned. 
One such early development was the creation of the Maryland 
Commission on Hereditary Disorders.48 This creation was prompted 
by legislative findings that "hereditary disorders are often costly and 
tragic and sometimes deadly burdens to the health and well-being of 
the citizens"49 and that detection through screening, as well as in­
creased medical knowledge, of hereditary disorders may lead to their 
alleviation or cure.50 In view of such findings, the Commission was 
delegated the authority "to adopt rules, regulations, and standards 
for the detection and management of hereditary disorders."51 The 
need for such a delegation was based on the further legislative find­
ing that "legislation designed to alleviate the problems associated 
with specific hereditary disorders may tend to be inflexible in the 
face of rapidly expanding medical knowledge."52 
The Maryland Commission's ability to promote the prevention 
of handicaps caused by hereditary disorders is limited in several 
major ways. First, individual participation in a hereditary disorder 
program should always be "wholly voluntary."53 Second, a heredi­
tary disorder program can never "require restriction of childbear­
ing"54 or "be a prerequisite for eligibility for any service or other 
47. For a recent review of scientific evidence and scientific speculation regarding 
the fetally toxic work environment, see Furnish, Prenalal Exposure 10 Felal(y Toiic Work 
Enviroflmenrs: The Dilemma of Ihe 1978 Pregnancy Amendmenllo Tirle VII oflhe Civil 
Rights ACI of 1964. 66 IOWA L. REV. 63. 119-29 (1980). 
48. MD. PUB. HEALTH CODE ANN. § 13-101 (1982). 
49. Id. § 13-102(2). 
50. Id. §§ 13-102(3i), 13-102(3ii). 
51. Id. § 13-109(a). 
52. Id. § 13-102(8). 
53. Id. §§ 13-102(10). 13-109(1)(1). 
54. Id. § 13-109(1)(2). 
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program."55 Finally, individual participants in a screening program 
fora hereditary disorder are subject only to nondirective counseling 
so that counselors simply provide the information needed for their 
clients to make decisions and avoid influencing those decisions.56 
Generally, when states have sought legislatively to prevent 
handicaps in newborns caused by nonhereditary factors, a similar 
voluntary, noncoercive, and nondirective approach is taken. In ad­
dition to the enactment of a Hereditary Disorders Act quite compa­
rable to that of Maryland,S7 the California legislature sought to 
prevent other forms of birth handicaps with a similar approach. For 
example, the California State Department of Health Services is au­
thorized to "conduct a statewide program for providing nutritional 
food supplements to low-income pregnant women."S8 This authori­
zation was based upon a legislative finding that "evidence increas­
ingly points to adequate nutrition as a determinant not only of good 
physical health but also of full intellectual development and educa­
tional achievement, with adequate nutrition in the earliest months 
and years being particularly important."59 The same department 
has also been mandated to "maintain a program for the prevention 
of blindness."60 -..., 
Federal legislative and regulatory policy is also patterned on a 
voluntary, noncoercive, and nondirective approach. For example, 
federal enactments provide financial assistance to states for several 
purposes: (I) To assure certain mothers. and children "access to 
quality maternal and child health services";61 (2) to reduce the "inci­
dence of preventable diseases and handicapping conditions among 
children...";62 and (3) to develop "counseling and testing programs 
and other programs for the diagnosis, control, and treatment of ge­
netic diseases. "63 States receiving such assistance generally cannot 
compel participation in programs supported by federal funding.64 
55. Id. § 13-109(f)(3). 
56. Id. §·13-109(g)(2)(i). See also Note. A Preference for Nonexistence: Wrongful 
L!le and a Proposed Tort ofGenetic Malpractice. 55S. CAL. L. REV. 477. 498-500 (1982). 
57. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ ISO-ISS (West 1979 & Supp. 1982). 
58. Id. § 311 (West Supp. 1982). 
59. Id. § 310 (West 1979). Notwithstanding this finding. the.program appears vol­
untary. Id. (suggesting the program has "potential" to reach all pregnant women). 
60. Id. § 428. See also id. §§ 289-289.6 (West Supp. 1982) (program addressing 
special needs of women likely to deliver. inter alia. disabled newborns). 
61. 42 U.S.C.A. § 70(a)(I) (West Supp. 1975-1981) .. 
62. Id. § 701(a)(2). 
63. Id. § 300b-1 (West 1982). 
64. Id. § 247b(g)(2) (programs of federally supported state preventive health serv­
ices must be voluntary); kl. § 300b-2 (voluntary participation for those in subsidized ge­
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However encouraging one finds the recent advances toward fur­
ther research, counseling, and testing on preventable handicaps, and 
however laudable one finds recent advances in the compensation 
and deterrence-based rules promoting handicap prevention, 
lawmakers must begin to consider more direct, coherent. and com­
prehensive laws promoting the avoidance and elimination of handi­
caps to newborns. Certain laws can be implemented today because 
of recently-developed scientific and medical understanding.· Al­
though other laws must await further developments, they must pres­
ently be discussed in the abstract so that when a proper 
understanding is achieved, the time lag or period of "maladjust­
ment"· will be as brief as possible. . 
IV. DIRECT, COHERENT AND ADEQUATE LAWS ON PREVEJ'.jTlNG 
HANDICAPS TO NEWBORNS 
A. Direct Laws 
Laws promoting the prevention of handicaps to newborns are 
often indirect, in that one of their central aims is not maintenance of 
a duty to the newborn to prevent handicaps. Instead, the laws focus 
on the maintenance of a duty to undertake reasonable conduct to­
ward others. Both tort and criminal laws reflect this indirect tack, 
and cases involving their implementation demonstrate that the laws 
often fail to promote prevention of handicaps to newborns without 
justification. 
An apt illustration in tort law is found in the 1977 Illinois 
Supreme Court decision in Renslow v. Mennonite Hospila/. 65 The 
case involved allegations that a hospital and its director of laborato­
ries had on two occasions negligently transfused a thirteen year old 
girl with Rh-positive blood, which was incompatible with and which 
netic diseases programs); Maternal and Child Health and Crippled Children's Services. 
42 C.F.R. § Sla.120 (1980) (acceptance of family planning services under plans for ma­
ternal and child health are voluntary); Project Grants for Genetic Diseases Testing and 
Counseling Programs, 42 C.F.R. § Slf.106(a)(l)(iii) (1982) (project grants for genetic dis­
eases testing and counseling programs must be provided for all persons concerned about 
having, or being carriers of, any genetic diseases). On the funding of genetic diseases 
programs, see Note, supra note 7, at 918. On the possibility of mandatory panicipation 
in federally supponed programs, see S. REP. No. 860, 9Sth Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinred in 
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 9134, 9168; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE 
STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RE­
SEARCH. SCREENING AND COUNSELING FOR GENETIC COJ'DITIONS II-IS-II-17 (1982). 
On the constitutional problems posed by mandatory screening. see Note. supra note 7. 
6S. 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 12S0 (1977). 
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sensitized her Rh-negative blood.66 Further, the case involved alle­
gations that defendants discovered that they had administered the 
incompatible blood, but at no time had notified the girl's mother or 
family.67 The girl first learned that her blood had been sensitized 
over eight years later, when a routine blood screening was ordered 
by a physician in the course of prenatal care.68 A short time later she 
learned of the sensitization and allegedly, as the result of such sensi­
tization, she delivered a child that was jaundiced and suffering from 
hyperbilirubinemia. It was alleged that the child had suffered per~ 
manent brain and nervous system damage as the result of defend­
ants' acts. 69 The Supreme Court of Illinois found that the child 
stated a cause of action against defendants, finding them potentially 
liable to a person whose existence was not apparent at the time of the 
acts.70 
The court's finding that the child possessed a cause of action 
promoted the prevention of handicaps indirectly rather than directly. 
Stated as part of the court's holding was the fact that the child has "a 
right to be born free from prenatal injuries forseeably caused by a 
breach of duty to the child's mother."71 Of course, the recognition of 
a duty to the mother is based on the policy that one who acts unrea­
sonably to a living patient in providing medical services should com­
pensate the patient for unreasonable acts. The court did not find a 
duty owed to the child, regardless of any duty owed to its mother.72 
Had it been recognized by the court, this independent duty would 
have been direct, based on the policy that in certain situations a duty 
to act so as to prevent handicaps at birth is owed to the unborn. 
An illustration of indirect reasoning in criminal law is the series 
of state supreme court cases disallowing prosecutions for the inten­
tio'nal murder of a fertilized, implanted fetus where the criminal de­
66. Id. at 349. 367 N.E.2d at 1251. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 357. 367 N.E.2d at 1255. 1256. 
71. Id. 
72. Compare the opinions of Justice Moran. /d .. (discussion of "transferred negli­
gence" and "derivative actions") with the opinion of Justice Dooley. id. at 366. 367 
N.E.2d at 1259 (discussion of legal rights of unborn. with no indication they are depen­
dent on rights of Mother. or derivative). See also Robenson. Toward Rational Boundaries 
oj Torr Liabi"~)'jor Injur,l' to the Unborn: Prenatal Injuries, Preconception Injuries and 
Wrongful Life. 1978 DUKE L.J. 1401, 1417 ("[b)ut whether liability was based on an 
independent duty to this 'separate organism' or on a contingent duty that matured when 
the infant was born alive has never been made clear in many jurisdictions"). 
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fendant was not involved in a consensual abortion.73 In each of the 
cases, the court held that the fetus was not a person within the mean­
ing of the state's homicide statute.74 Although the defendant could 
still be prosecuted for various crimes involving the pregnant woman 
as the victim, these prosecutions would only indirectly promote the 
prevention of handicaps to newborns. The strength of this promo­
tion would be lessened because the harm to the prospective mother is 
often far less serious than the harm to her fetus. Thus, these indirect 
prosecutions-if initiated-would encompass crimes such as abor­
tion, assault, and battery; crimes that carry less severe penalties than 
does homicide.75 
A partial explanation of the indirect nature of laws promoting 
handicap prevention may lie in a misunderstanding of the Supreme 
Court of the United States' decisions in Roe v. Wade, which ad­
dresses the legal status of the unborn.76 One California appellate 
court affirmed the dismissal of a homicide prosecution of a defend­
73. People v. Greer, 79 Ill. 2d 103,402 N.E.2d 203 (1980); State v. Brown, 378 So. 
2d 916 (La. 1979); State v. Anderson, 135 N.J. Super. 423, 343 A.2d 505 (Law Div. 1975); 
State v. Larsen, 578 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1978). See also People v. Guthrie, 97 Mich. App. 
226, 293 N. W .2d 775 (1980) (dismissing a charge of negligent homicide where the victim 
was a fetus "ready for birth," while calling the born-alive rule "archaic"). Bur see IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 707.7 (West 1979) (noting feticide involves the intentional termination of a 
human pregnancy after the second trimester); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.00 (McKinney 
1975) (defining homicide as including death of an unborn child of more than twenty-four 
weeks); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-5 (1981) (willful killing of an unborn quick child in 
certain circumstances is manslaughter). See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 
1982) (a parent's failure to provide necessities for a minor child is a misdemeanor, and a 
"child conceived but not yet born is to be deemed an existing person"). 
74. People v. Greer, 79 Ill. 2d 103, 116,402 N.E.2d 203; 209 (1980); State v. Brown, 
378 So. 2d 916, 918 (La. 1979); State v. Anderson, 135 N.J. Super. 423, 429, 343 A.2d 505. 
509 (Law Div. 1975) (fetuses found to be victims of murder for they were born alive and 
then died); State v. Larsen, 578 P.2d 1280, 1282 (Utah 1978). 
75. For a review of available Louisiana criminal law after State v. Brown, 378 So. 
2d 916 (La. 1979), see Parness & Pritchard, To Be Or Nor To Be: Prolecring rhe Unborn's 
POlenrialiry of Life, 51 U. ON. L. REV. 257, 269-70 (1982). Even where state criminal 
laws appear direct in that fetuses are potential victims of homicidal acts, punishment for 
killing a fetus is often far less severe than punishment for killing a person born alive: 
nonviable fetuses may not be included as victims of crime-even where the actor is not 
the mother; and the legislative goal may not have been the protection of the fetus' poten­
tiality for life. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00, 125.45 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1982-1983) 
(acts causing miscarriage in third trimester prompt a maximum sentence of only seven 
years in prison); Note, The Law and rhe Unborn Child' The Legal and Logicallnconsis­
lencies, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 349, 364 (1971); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150-52 (1973) 
(each noting uncertainty regarding original purpose of early abortion statutes-protec­
tion of the mother or the child). 
76. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (declaring the Texas statutory scheme regulating abortion 
10 be unconstitutional because of its restrictions on women's constitutionally protected 
right to privacy). 
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ant who had allegedly killed a previable human fetus although the 
criminal statute defined homicide as "the unlawful killing (If a 
human being, or a fetus."77 The court failed to implement the stat­
ute because of its reading of Roe: 
The underlying rationale of Wade, therefore, is that until viability 
is reached, human life in the legal sense has not come into exist­
ence. Implicit in Wade is the conclusion that as a matter of consti­
tutionallaw the destruction of a non-viable fetus is not the taking 
of'human life. It follows that such destruction cannot constitute 
murder or other form of homicide, whether committed by a 
mother, a father (as here), or a third person.7S 
The California court clearly misread Roe. In Roe, the Supreme 
Court held only that a previable fetus was not a "person" enjoying 
fourteenth amendment protection79 and specifically refused to re­
solve the difficult question of when life begins. so In fact, the high 
court noted that while they are treated differently under the law than 
living persons, the unborn have been accorded certain legal rights.sl 
In a later case involving the term "dependent child," which is found 
in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program 
of the Social Security Act,82 the high court determined whether the 
term encompassed the unborn without even referring to its treatment 
of the unborn in Roe.83 
Is there more than a semantic difference between indirect and 
direct promotion of handicap prevention in, for example, a Renslow 
setting, where a girl was born handicapped as the result of a defend­
ant's preconception negligent conduct toward the girl's mother? 
Surely there is, if the mother's contributory negligence causes there 
77. People v. Smith, 59 Cal. App. 3d 751. 129 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1976) (construing 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1982 Supp.». 
78. fd. at 757. 129 Cal. Rptr. at 502. For failure to implement wrongful death act 
because of misreading of Roe. see Toth v. Goree. 65 Mich. App. 296. 300. 237 N.W.2d 
297.301 (1975); Wallace v. Wallace, 120 N.H. 675.678,421 A.2d 134. 137 (1980). 
79. 410 U.S. at 156-57. 
80. Id. at 159 ("[w)hen those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine. phi­
losophy and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus. the judiciary. at this point in 
the development of man's knowledge. is not in a position to speculate as to the answer. "). 
81. Id. at 161 ("the law has been reluctant ... to accord legal rights to the unborn 
except in narrowly defined situations and except when the rights are contingent upon live 
birth"). 
82. 42 U.S.c. §§ 601-613 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
83. Burns v. Alcala. 420 U.S. 575 (1975). The determination was based on inquir­
ies into the legislative language. the legislative history. and the administrative practice 
pursuant to the legislation. Id. at 578-79. 581-82. 584-86. 
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to be no breach of duty to the gir1.84 Similarly, damages might differ 
if there were two distinct duties, one owing to the mother and an­
other to the gir1.85 Moreover, a duty to prevent handicaps could be 
assessed against the mother in the girl's favor in a more direct set­
ting.86 Finally, application of the crucial "foreseeability" criterion 
might differ, as the forseeability of someone being harmed by the 
negligent performance of medical services on behalf of another dif­
fers from the forseeability of someone other than a living person who 
is the recipient of medical services. This final difference is not with­
out significance outside the realm of tort law.8? 
In part, the contemporary failure to recognize the duty to pre­
vent handicaps might originate from the general discomfort that ex­
ists with regard to many of the issues implicit in discussions of such a 
duty. To what extent do prospective parents have a duty to their 
84. Sura note 72. Seealso Fallaw v. Hobbs. 113 Ga. App. 181. 184-85. 147 S.E.2d 
517. 520 (1966) (pregnant woman's negligence is not imputable to her child who sues a 
second tortfeasor for injuries caused while inutero based on a Georgia statute which 
states that parental fault is not imputable to the child). See also City of Louisville v. 
Stuckenborg, 438 S.W.2d 94, 97 (Ky. 1969) (contributory negligence of pregnant woman 
leading to her child's death shortly after birth not imputable to her husband who sues 
under a wrongful death act for the loss of his child). 
85. For example, differences would arise in a comparative negligence jurisdiction 
where the negligence of the mother might be imputed to the girl if no independent duty 
to the girl is established. Fallaw v. Hobbs, 113 Ga. App. 181. 184-85. 147 S.E.2d 517. 520 
(1966). As well, differing damages might reasonably flow or be foreseeable from a doc­
tor's breach of a duty to provide reasonable health care to a girl or woman who is a 
potential mother than from a doctor's breach of a duty to undertake reasonable conduct 
toward the potential offspring of a female patient. To date, the breach of the duty owed 
to a mother has often led to recovery by an afterborn child for the child's birth with 
disabilities caused by prenatal injuries, with no discussion of any distinct duty to the 
mother's unborn child. 67 Ill. 2d at 358, 367 N.E.2d at 1255. But see Hughson v. SI. 
Francis Hosp. of Port Jervis, 9 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2351 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 9. 1983). 
Compare Hughes v. Hutt. 455 A.2d 623 CPa. 1983) (woman's deception regarding her use 
of birth control held not to be a defense to an afterborn child's paternity suit). 
86. If distinct duties were found owed by the defendant to both the mother and the 
girl. then later establishment of some duty (presumably within federal constitutional lim­
its regarding childbearing and childrearing) owed the girl from her mother would be 
easier (presumably after the elimination of a parental immunity barrier). For some 
thoughts on a potential parent's duty to future offspring, see Dinsdale. Child v. Parent: A 
Viable New Tort of Wrongful L(fe? 24 ARIZ. L. REV. 391 (1982); Robertson. supra note 
66. at 1413: Comment. Parental Liabih~Ffor Prenatal inju!,),. 14 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. 
PROBS. 47 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Parental Liability]: Comment. Preconception Negli­
gence: Reconciling an Emerging TOr!. 67 GEO. L.J. 1239. 1260-61 (1979) [hereinafter 
cited as Preconception Negligence}. 
87. Consider the law regarding third party beneficiaries to contracts. Comment. 
Third Parn Ben¢ciaries and the Restatement (Second) ofContracts. 67 CORNELL L. REV. 
880 (1982). 
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unborn children?88 When should the law presume that prospective 
parents' decisions are consistent with their future offsprings' best in­
terests?8'1 To what extent can the state intrude upon living persons' 
decisions which will, or may, have negative impact on the unborn?'1O 
When, if ever, should the laws recognize certain potential persons' 
interests in not being born due to the prospect of severe handicaps?91 
88. See King, The juridical Status of the Fetus: A Proposalfor Legal Prolection of 
Ihe Unborn, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1647, 1678, 1682-83 (1979) (suggesting maternal responsi­
bility can only be fully assessed after fetal viability); Comment, Paren/al Liabi/i~J', supra 
note 86. at 85-87 (suggesting a "reasonably prudent expecting parent standard." which is 
to be maintained only after the parents were aware or had reason to be aware of the 
pregnancy-even if awareness predated the fetus' viability); Comment; Preconception 
Negligence, supra note 86. at 1260-61 (suggesting recognition of claims by children 
against their parents for prenatal or preconception negligence would be desirable. but 
that such recognition awaits substantial statutory or common law development). 
89. With respect to children who are born. it has been strongly urged that the pre­
sumption of consistency be maintained unless there appears a substantial risk that the 
child will imminently suffer a physical harm that will cause serious injury. See Com­
ment. Constitutional Limitalions on Stale In/erven/ion in Prenatal Care, 67 VA. L. REV. 
1051, 1062-64 (1981). But see Parham v. J.R .. 442 U.S. 584,604 (1974) (no absolute 
parental right to institutionalize a living child). Regarding unborn children. ihe risk of 
physical harm standard may not be relevant to prospective parents' decisions regarding 
their future offspring. Conslilutional Limilations on Stale In/erven/ion in Parental Care. 
67 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1064-67 (1982) (suggesting a balancing-of-interests approach is nec­
essary to assure no undue state interference with the various privacy rights involved in 
prenatal health care). See also Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246. 256 (1978) (finding 
natural father of an illegitimate child need not be given the same authority to block an 
adoption by a stepfather as the law gives a divorced father because the natural fa:her was 
assumed to have never shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the daily 
supervision. education. protection. or care of the child); Justus v. Atchison. 19 Cal. 3d 
564.581. 565 P.2d 122. 133. 139 Cal. Rptr. 97. 108 (1977) (distinguishing between harm 
to parents caused by death of a born child and by death of a fetus). 
90. There is precedent for state intrusion when pregnant womens' desires about 
health care run contrary to both their own and their fetus' interests. See, e.g., Jefferson v. 
Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth .. 247 Ga. 86.274 S.E.2d 457 (1981) (medical proce­
dures ordered for pregnant woman over her religious objections in a situation where 
there was a 99-100% chance of fetal death and 50% chance of maternal death without 
them. and nearly a 100% chance that both would survive with them); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul 
Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson. 42 N.J. 421. 201 A.2d 537. cerl. denied. 377 U.S. 
985 (1964) (over religious objections. viable fetus' and mother's lives would be saved by 
order of blood transfusions). Yet. to date. states have done far less to protect the unborn 
when maternal health is not an issue and where there are not life-threatening circum­
stances facing the unborn. See, e.g., Baby X. v. Misiano. 373 Mass. 265. 366 N.E.2d 755 
(1977) (father's duty to suppon child did not encompass an unborn fetus); In re Dittrick 
Infant. 80 Mich. App. 219.263 N.W.2d 37 (1977) (Probate Code not read to grant the 
unborn the protections of child custody laws. though amendments to the Code allowing 
such a reading were desirable). 
91. Some would say never. See, e.g .. Phillips v. U.S.. 508 F. Supp. 537. 543 (D.S.C. 
1980); Berman v. Allen. 80 N.J. 421. 425. 404 A.2d 8. 12 (1979). Contra. Turpin. 643 P.2d 
at 962-64. 183 Cal. Rptr. at 345-46; Harbeson v. Parke-Davis. Inc .• No. 48331-1 (Wash. 
Sup. Ct. Jan. 6. 1983) (following Turpin). See also Dinsdale. supra note 79. at 419 (the 
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Notwithstanding the discomfort with many of the relevant is­
sues, the time is ripe to explore the means by which laws can more 
directly prevent handicaps to newborns. Little discomfort should be 
felt in implementing many necessary changes. For example, it 
should be easy to recognize in both tort and criminal law a duty to 
undertake reasonable conduct toward unborn who are clearly forsee­
able to the actor and whose interests are not in conflict with the in­
terests of any others touched by the actor. Thus, one who counsels 
or medically treats a woman who is seeking to bear a normal and 
healthy child should owe a duty both to the woman and her unborn 
offspring.92 The scenario is not much different from a new mother 
seeking a well baby checkup for her newborn. By this standard one 
who intentionally assaults a visibly pregnant woman without her 
consent should be deemed to be acting criminally against both the 
woman and her fetus. 
Somewhat more discomfort is felt with other possible changes. 
For example, if a duty to undertake reasonable conduct toward the 
unborn be recognized in tort law, then should that duty encompass 
those who cannot clearly forsee the unborn,93 or those who have 
conflicting responsibilities to one or both of the unborn's potential 
parents?94 And, if such a duty is at times recognized, where should 
rational distinctions be drawn between instances where there is and 
is not a duty?9S Further, how far should the courts go in drawing 
such distinctions before the legislature is called upon to continue the 
task of line drawing?96 Finally, to what extent may proof of fault in 
tort litigation be unnecessary where claimants seek compensation for 
imposition of parental duty to abon is unwarranted and suggestive of Orwellian 
genetics). 
92. Because of the presumption that parents act in their offspring's best interests, a 
conftict between duty to parent and child might only arise if the parent were abusive or 
neglectful. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584,602-03 (1979). . 
93. Couns recognizing child's claims for preconception tOns at times seemingly 
require foreseeability of some form of harm to some future person. Renslow, 67 IlL 2d at 
357,364-65,367 N.E.2d at 1255, 1258 (Dobley, J., concurring). But see Turpin, 643 P.2d 
at 956, 960, 965, 182 CaL Rptr. at 339, 343, 348 (requiring Ii "but for" tes~ in a child's 
preconception ton claim where negligent diagnosis of one child by a speech and hearing 
specialist led to the binh of a second child). 
94. Consider an employer who has a duty not to engage in sex discrimination, but 
who operates a facility posing health dangers only to the future offspring of female em­
ployees. For a suggested solution to this tension between prospective mothers and their 
offspring, see Furnish, supra note 47, at 115. 
95. Renslow. 67 Ill. 2d at 357, 367 N.E.2d at 1255. 
96. Jorgensen, 483 F.2d at 240-41. 
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handicaps resulting from defendants' prenatal acts?97 
In criminal law similar issues give rise to heightened discomfort. 
Should it be a crime against the fetus for one to harm unintention­
ally a visibly pregnant woman's fetus, with or without maternal con­
sent?98 And, sho.uld it be a crime against the unborn to trigger the 
potentiality of handicaps at birth, perhaps where subsequent birth 
and even conception is uncertain and where the prospective parent 
or parents accede to the triggering acts?99 Finally, to what extent 
should prospective parents be made responsible under criminal law 
for conduct which does, or may, lead to birth handicaps of their 
offspring? 100 
In discussing these more discomforting issues, a recognition of 
the need for intricate line drawing must be maintained. In tort law, 
the "specter of successive generations of plaintiffs complaining 
against a single defendant for harm caused by genetic damage done 
an ancestor in a nuclear accident," or of "perpetual claims arising 
from chemical accident or long-term radiation exposure," may be 
troublesome to many who are sympathetic to the unborn 101 and may 
require intricate linedrawing. Equally troubling are questions re­
garding the extent to which a prospective parent or parents can be 
made defendants in tort actions initiated on behalf of their off­
springlO2 and regarding prenatal parental conduct. 103 The partial or 
complete abrogation of parental immunity in suits by children in­
volving postnatal conduct suggests that state policy often supports 
initiation of suits based 'on prenatal conduct. I04 
97. Id. at 241 (father whose twin daughters' Mongoloidism was caused by the de­
fendant's oral contraceptive product had strict liability claim under Oklahoma law) . 
. 98. Consider, for example, the serious hann resulting from a pregnant woman's 
panicipation in a touch football game-or perhaps her being struck by an errant football 
as she strolled in the ·park. If the foregoing prompts a quick and simple negative re­
sponse, does such a response continue if one assumes some negligent-or grossly negli­
gent~nduct? 
99. Consider, for example, the possible criminal liability for the harm caused by an 
employer's maintenance of a toxic workplace. See Furnish, supra note 47. 
100. For a possible case, see Parness & Pritchard, supra note 75, at 297. 
101. Renslow, 67 Ill. 2d at 357, 367 N.E.2d at 1255. 
102. ~ For a review of the practical difficulties with such suits, see Comment, Paren­
lal Liabiliry. supra note 86. at 88-89. 
103. One author has concluded gross negligence is the point at which a woman's 
right to control freely her own body should be subordinated to the unborn child's right to 
begin life with a sound mind and body. Note, Reco~er)'for Prenalallnjuries: The RighI 
ofa Child Againsl lIS MOlher, 10 SUFFOLK V.L. REV. 582. 609 (1976). See also supra 
note 88. 
104. After reviewing the erosion of the parent-child ton immunity doctrine. one 
author concluded: 
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In criminal laws under which the unborn can be victims the is­
sue is the criminal's familiarity with the existence of a fetus or with 
the potentiality for parenthood of one with whom the criminal deals. 
It may be unfair to charge with crimes all those who cause physical 
or mental handicaps to newborns, even where their action is socially 
undesirable. lOS For example, it may be unreasonable to charge with 
assault one who causes severe physical or mental handicaps to a 
newborn whose pregnant mother was involved in otherwise non­
criminal "horseplay" with the would-be defendant, at least where 
neither the would-be defendant nor the mother knew during their 
play of the pregnancy. Thus, as in tort law, linedrawing in criminal 
law is necessary. Just as in tort law, problems regarding prenatal 
parental conduct subject to criminal sanction arise in crimes against 
the unborn, though precedent for parental culpability exists in some 
states. 106 
As compared with state laws involving children born alive, laws 
involving prenatal conduct by possible parents seemingly trigger not 
only differing perspectives of reasonable parental conduct or legiti­
mate exclusive areas of parental authority and discretion, \07 but also 
Thus. over the past fifteen years an increasing number of state courts have abro­
gated. either partially or entirely. the parental immunity doctrine. Given this 
growing recognition of parental liability for negligent injury to minor children 
and the universally recognized liability of third parties for prenatal injury. an 
action by the child against its parents for negligent prenatal injury seems to be 
both logically consistent with current trends in the law and jus\. In the absence 
of other prevailing considerations. it appears that the child's cause of action 
should lie. 
Comment, Parenlal Liabilit)', supra note 86, at 72. See, e.g .• Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. 
App. 396. 301 N.W.2d 869 (1980). 
105. Of course. liability in tort can extend far beyond liability in criminal law in an 
effort to deter, as well as compensate for, socially undesirable conduct. Both federal 
constitutional protections and legitimate state policy considerations support a finding of 
unfairness in criminal law with no corresponding finding in tort law. Consider. for ex­
ample. the differing treatment afforded slightly negligent acts by criminal and tort law (is 
the eighth amendment relevant'). 
106. c."'L. PEJ'oOAl CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1982) (parental failure to provide neces­
sities to a minor child is a misdemeanor. and a "child conceived but not yet born is to be 
deemed an existing person"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.7 (West 1979) ("any person" who 
intentionally terminates or tries to terininate a human pregnancy after the end of the 
second trimester is guilty of a felony, except where a physician acts to preserve the life of 
the pregnant woman); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.50. 125.55 (McKinney 1975) (self-abor­
tion in two degrees, wherein only one requires a resulting miscarriage but wherein both 
relate to maternal acts and are deemed misdemeanors). 
107. While some states abrogating parental tort immunity have adopted only a 
reasonable parent standard. others have retained immunity for acts involving certain ex­
ercises of parental authority and discretion. Compare Gibson v. Gibson. 3 Cal 3d 914. 
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differing federal constitutional concerns regarding childrearing. 108 
Parental childrearing interests rather than childbearing interests 
seem implicated, for in most tort and criminal law settings the pro­
spective parents' acts come only after a determinaiion has been made 
to bear a child. Where prospective parents' acts precede any deter­
mination to bear or beget, the acts are also typically unrelated to the 
decision to bear or beget and, at most, relate to decisions regarding 
childrearing. For example, a woman who takes heroin, knowing 
herself to be pregnant and to be desirous of bearing a child, could be 
deemed to have undertaken both the tortious and criminal conduct 
toward her unborn child,l°9 As well, a male with recognized 
childbearing potential, who consistently enters a workplace where 
significant exposure to vinyl chloride Or lead is assured, could be 
deemed to have undertaken both tortious and criminal conduct to­
ward his unborn child. 1 10 
In conclusion, it can be said that when exploring the means 
through which laws can more directly prevent handicaps to 
newborns, constant reminders of several major themes would greatly 
facilitate the inquiry. An understanding of these themes will assist in 
the resolution of the less complex issues presented and properly fo­
cus attention on the more difficult ones. These themes involve the 
479 P.2d 648 (1971). 92 Cal. Rptr. 288. wilh Goller v. White. 20 Wis. 2d 402. 122 N.W.2d 
193 (1963). 
108. Regarding parental rights to rear their children. the United States Supreme 
Court hils said: "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child 
reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for 
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." Prince v. Commonwealth. 321 U.S. 
158, 166 (1943). Yet. parental authority is not absolute. The Court has recognized that 
the state as parens patriae can act to guard the general interest in youth's well being, and 
thus can restrict parental decision-making in such matters as school attendance and child 
labor. Id See also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584. 602-03 (1979) ("a state is not without 
control over parental discretion in dealing with children when their physical or mental 
health is jeopardized"). 
\09. A pregnant woman's use of heroin seemingly has little to do with her constitu­
tionally protected decision to bear or beget children. 410 U.S. at 153. Yet. her heroin use 
can cause severe adverse effects for her unborn child's physical or mental health. In re 
John Children. 61 Misc. 2d 347, 354-56, 306 N.Y.S.2d 797. 806-07 (1969). It would thus 
be legitimate for the state as parens patriae to act to guard the unborn child's well being. 
Infra note 116. 
110. For example, the exposure of a male of childbearing capacity to repeated and 
significant doses of certain substances typically has little to do with any childbearing 
decision; but again. a future child's physical or mental health can be severely impaired. 
Howard. Hazardous Subslances in Ihe Workplace: Implicalions Jor Ihe Employmem Righls 
oj Women. 129 U. PA. L. REV. 798. 803-05 (1981) (such substances may well include lead 
and vinyl chloride). 
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legitimacy of state protection of the unborn and state characteriza­
tions of the unborn as persons. 
First, the state has legitimate interests in preventing handicaps 
to newborns caused by prenatal conduct, notwithstanding what ap­
pears to many as a lack of respect for the unborn in the Roe decision. 
In fact, the Roe court expressly recognized this realm of governmen­
tal power by indicating that Texas had an "important and legitimate 
interest in protecting the potentiality of life"lll and by referring with 
approval to state laws seeking to improve the unborn's quality of life 
after birth. I 12 The Court has reaffirmed its view on the legitimacy of 
such power since Roe in a case involving alleged welfare benefits for 
the unborn. JJ3 
Second, notwithstanding the decision in Roe, the unborn can be 
viewed under many laws as "persons" deserving of certain legal 
rights and protections. While "the unborn have never been recog­
nized in the law as persons in the whole sense," 114 and will probably 
never be so viewed, liS there is much the state can do legitimately to 
directly promote the unborns' interest in achieving their potentiality 
for life without any accompanying physical or mental handicaps. 1 16 
In particular, the unborn can be more fully recognized as being "per­
sons" directly affected by both tortious and criminal conduct, and 
thus as being appropriate plaintiffs in tort litigation and victims in 
criminal prosecution. 
B. Coherent Lows 
Laws promoting the prevention of handicaps to newborns are 
sometimes incoherent in that they further such underlying purposes 
as compensation and deterrence in an unequal way, with random 
111. 410 U.S. at 162. 
112. Id. at 161·62 (referring to laws on inheritance and other means of transferring 
property, as well as laws allowing compensation in tort). And see Parness, Social Com­
mentary: Values and Legal Personhood, 83 W. VA. L; REV. 487,498 (1981) (abortion is at 
times viewed as promoting the unborn's quality of life). 
113. Bums, 420 U.S. at 583 (Title V of the Social Security Act explicitly provides 
for monetary assistance to expectant mothers who are desirous of purchasing adequate 
medical care for unborn children). 
114. 410 U.S. at 162. 
liS. Parness, supra note 112, at 503 (in a clash of values involving protection of 
potential human life, promotion of individual freedom, and furtherance of the overall 
quality of life, the unborn's interests will sometimes be undermined). 
116. In Roe, the Coun found the states had an "important and legitimate interest 
in protecting the potentiality of human life." 410 U.S. at 162. This applies regardless of 
whether the state's interest was founded on a theory that a new human life is present 
from the moment of conception. Id. at 150. 
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rather than rational distinctions between what is prevented and who 
is protected. Again, tort and criminal laws provide examples of such 
incoherence. 
In the area of tort law, compensation is sometimes awarded a 
newborn and his family for injuries resulting from a defendant's acts 
prior to the newborn's birth but after its conception, but not for inju­
ries resulting from a defendant's preconception acts.ll7 This distinc­
tion seems arbitrary. I IS Also arbitrary is the distinction made in 
wrongful death and survival claims between fetuses who incur de­
fendant's harmful conduct and who die therefrom shortly after live 
birth, and fetuses who incur a defendant's harmful conduct and who 
are not born alive as a result. 119 In the latter setting, immediately 
harmful acts upon a fetus are treated less harshly than acts taking 
longer to produce the ultimate harm.120 
In criminal law, as noted earlier, the unborn often go unnoticed 
117. Compare Albala v. City of New York. 54 N.Y.2d 269, 429 N.E.2d 786, 445 
N.Y.S.2d 108 (1981) (disallowing recovery for preconception acts) with Endresz v. Fried­
berg. 24 N.Y.2d 478.248 N.E.2d 901, 905. 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (\969) (allowing recovery for 
post conception acts. as long as child is born alive). 
118. In drawing the distinction between preconception and postconception acts 
preceding birth, one court expressed concern that non artificial and nonarbitrary lines 
could not be rationally drawn by the courts between certain preconception acts and 
others-though it hinted that the legislature might be capable of such linedrawing. Al­
bala v. City of New York, 54 N.Y.2d 269,273.429 N.E.2d 786, 788. 445 N.Y.S.2d 108. 
110(\981). Such an expression fails to legitimize. however. judicial distinctions between 
preconception and postconception acts prior to birth. Similarly "staggering implica­
tions" and "unlimited hypotheses" accompany the necessary distinctions between certain 
postconception but prebirth acts and others. Id. at 273. 429 N.E.2d at 788. 445 N.Y.S.2d 
at 110. As well. the court was concerned over the impact of encouraging "defensive 
medicine." Id. at 274, 429 N.E.2d at 788, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 110. Yet, whatever it meant 
by "defensive medicine." the case was an easy one for it concerned preconception acts 
Ihat were not only harmful to the later-born child. but also were negligent and harmful to 
the child's mother. Id. at 271. 429 N.E.2d at 787. 445 N.Y.S.2d at 109. Thus. the case did 
not involve a scenario wherein the duty owed to the woman conflicted in any way with 
any duty found to be owing to her potential offspring. 
. 119. For a defense of this born alive rule. both where the death is and is oot di­
rectly caused by the tort feasor, see Robertson, supra note 72, at 1420-34. Yet. it seems 
that compensation even where no live birth followed would not be a "windfall"; would 
help compensate parents. at the least, for "sentimental loss"; and could be reconciled 
with Roe. in that the tortfeasor's acts (unlike a woman's) neither trigger any constitu­
tional protections nor promote any legitimate social values. Id. at 1429-30. 1434 n.184. 
Another arbitrary distinction in the wrongful death act area involves the viability re­
quirement. !d. at 1419 (pre viability injury should be treated similarly to postviability 
injury). 
120. Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co .. 34 Wis. 2d 14. 18-19. 148 
N.W.2d 107. 110 (1967). This does not suggest. however. that damages will necessarily. 
or even usually, be more substantial in cases involving stillbirth than in cases involving 
birth with handicaps. 
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in the law as victims. 12 1 Yet even where the unborn are recognized 
as victims of crime, irrational differentiations are sometimes made 
between one form of criminal conduct and another. For example, 
while California does proscribe in its murder statute the nonconsen­
sual killing of a fetus, its manslaughter statute does not so pro­
scribe. 122 In Mississippi 123 and Rhode Island,124 manslaughter 
includes only the willful killing of an unborn quick child, apparently 
failing to recognize nonquickened fetuses as victims. 125 
As with the need for more direct laws preventing handicaps to 
newborns, the exploration of the means necessary to create more co­
herent laws will cause some discomfort and should be guided by the 
understanding that the state can legitimately protect the unborn in 
many settings by deeming them to be persons worthy of legal rights 
and protections. Little discomfort should be felt in implementing 
many necessary changes to eliminate differentiations among the 
born, unborn, and varying types of unborn. Thus, one whose acts 
impact upon a person of childbearing capacity may be deemed to 
owe that person's potential offspring some duty to exercise due care, 
regardless of whether the person is pregnant or at the viability stage 
of a pregnancy. Further, one who intentionally assaults a visibly 
pregnant woman without her consent should be deemed to be acting 
criminally against the fetus, regardless of fetal viability, the subse­
quent live birth of the fetus, or the nature of the injury to the fetus. 
As there are no constitutionally-protected privacy rights regarding 
assaults against the unborn, there is no reason why one causing a still 
birth should be treated differently than one whose acts cause a new­
born to expire after a very short afterbirth life. 126 Similarly there is 
no reason why one whose prenatal acts caused a newborn serious 
physical and mental handicaps should be treated differently than 
one whose prenatal acts caused a fetus to be still born or a newborn 
to expire after a very short afterbirth life. 127 
121. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
122. Comment, Feticide in California: A Proposed Statutory Scheme, 12 U.CO. L. 
REV. 723, 725 (1979). 
123. MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-37 (1972). 
124. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-5 (1981). 
125. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010 (1981) (forbidding certain operations 
seeking to terrninale the "pregnancy of a nonviable fetus"). and consider whether even 
that statute has the nonquickened fetus as a victim. See also Roe. 410 U.S. at 151. 
126. The distinction has been made, but was unsupported by reasons other than 
the common law tradition and the lack of a clear legislative intent to overturn such a 
practice. State v. Anderson, 135 N.J. Super. 423. 428. 343 A.2d 505. 508-09 (Law Oi\,. 
1975 ). 
127. Id. 
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C. Adequate Laws 
Even with more direct and more coherent laws providing better 
compensation in tort and greater deterrence through criminal sanc­
tion, laws promoting the prevention of handicaps to newborns still 
would be inadequate if they operated only after the onset of the 
handicaps sought to be prevented. In situations where preventable 
handicapping conditions appear, the law does little to assist in the 
avoidance or elimination of the future newborn's handicaps. The 
laws' failure in this regard is particularly troublesome in circum­
stances where any litigation in tort is not likely to result in significant 
compensation for IOSSl28 and where the criminal law may not 
operate. 129 
There are several circumstances' in which contemporary law 
might be deemed inadequate. One such circumstaq.ce arises where a 
person is about to commit a tortious or criminal act likely to produce 
handicaps to a newborn and the law disallows injunctive relief to bar 
such an act. 130 Another circumstance might be where large numbers 
of entities are preparing to act in a way likely to produce handicaps 
in newborns, with any prospect of later assessment of individual re­
sponsibility highly unlikely. 131 Yet another might be where the indi­
viduals responsible for some forseeable future persons' birth 
handicaps are 'not likely to be around when the handicapped 
newborns appear. 132 
Contemporary law may be able to provide more adequate pro­
tection of newborns from physical and mental handicaps in ,several 
ways. Part of the answer lies in the more immediate use of medical 
128. For example. compensation may not be fonhcoming where parental ton im­
munity exists; where industry-wide acts preclude one from demonstrating any necesary 
link belween injury and a panicular actor; and where the time lag between act and. re­
sulting handir otp is long enough that the actor can no longer be found. at least with 
money. . 
129. For example. it may be found to be noncriminal to cause injury recklessly. at 
least where the actor was unaware of the link between act and injury; or to cause injury 
intentionally. at least where public policy suppons noninfringement on prospective par­
ents' freedoms through the absence of criminal'sanctions beyond those generally applica­
ble to the populace. 
130. For example. an unborn may not be a "person" entitled to bring suit on its 
own behalf. Similarly. an unborn may not be able to show irreparable harm based on a 
non-life-threatening handicap. 
131. Later assessment is often unlikely because of an inability to match injuries to 
acts of a panicular entity. See supra note 45. 
132. See, e.g .• 67 I1l. 2d at 376-77. 367 N.E.2d at 1264 (Ryan. J.. dissenting) (sug­
gesting up to thiny-seven years could have passed between defendant's action and plain­
titrs handicap). 
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and scientific advances regarding the unborn to promote the further 
federal regulatory protection of the unborn, together with the expan­
sion of state child support, abuse, and custody laws and the possible 
imposition of mandatory screening and procreation laws, which are 
scientifically and morally justifiable. Certainly necessary are the 
traditional legal protections, usually encompassing tort and criminal 
law, together with financial support promoting medical and scientific 
research, the free flow of information to whomever is interested, and 
voluntary screening for certain hereditary disorders. But they are 
inadequate during an era when significant. new insights into the 
causes of handicaps at birth are commonplace. 
I. Federal Regulatory Protection 
To date, as a result of conflicting and ambiguous statutory man­
dates, federal regulatory protection of the unborn has been spotty 
and is often founded on rather precarious ground. Further protec­
tion would be possible if delegations of authority to federal agencies 
were more harmonious and more explicit regarding the agency's 
duty to safeguard the unborn. 
One illustration of seemingly confiicting mandates is the inter­
face between the responsibilities under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
and the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) in a work en­
vironment potentially toxic to fetuses. The employer controlling 
such an environment has the duty to comply with the standards of 
the Secretary of Labor under OSHA, which ensure that "no em­
ployee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capac­
ity."133 Standards for occupational exposure to lead provide an 
example of where "functional capacity" was read to include the ca­
pacity to produce healthy children 134 and thus, the promotion of fe­
tal protection led to differing treatment of pregnant women in the 
workplace. 13S Yet these standards have been found to be difficult to 
reconcile with the 1978 Pregnancy Amendment to title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act,136 which states that ''women affected by pregnancy, 
childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for 
133. 29 U.S.C § 655(b)(5) (1976). 
134. 43 Fed. Reg. 54,354, 54,421 (1978). 
135. For a review of the standards for occupational exposure to lead, and a criti­
cism thereof for not more fully ensuring prevention of fetal harm, see Furnish, supra note 
47, at 70-74. 
136. Act of Oct. 31. 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (current version at 42 
U.S.C § 2000e (1976». 42 U.S.C § 2000e(k) (Supp. IV 1980). 
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all employment-related purposes."137 This difficulty has been recog­
nized but can not be reconciled by the Equal Employment Opportu­
nity Commission. 138 Several suggestions on how harmony may be 
achieved tlave recently been offered,l39 The problems revealed by 
the foregoing conflict are compounded by certain ambiguities in the 
relevant statutory language. For example, it has been suggested that 
the Secretary of Labor's interpretation of "functional capacity" as 
including the capacity to produce healthy children is erroneous. l40 
An illustration of inadequate protection of the unborn resulting 
from liberal delegation of congressional power can be found in Burns 
v. Alcala ,141 In that case, the Supreme Court of the United State~ 
faced the question of whether states receiving federal financial aid 
under the AFDC program142 must offer welfare benefits to pregnant 
women for their unborn children. 143 Viewing the issue solely as one 
of statutory construction,l44 the Court responded in the negative 
after finding that the phrase "dependent children" did not encom­
pass fetuses. 14s The Court noted that Congress had provided for 
medical care to expectant mothers in another federally-funded pro­
gram. l46 Yet that program was not mandatory upon the states pro­
viding welfare benefits to children. 147 The Court noted that 
137. Id. 
138. Furnish, supra note 47, at 112-15. 
139. Id. at 115-18; Williams, supra note 10, at 668-703; Howard, supra note 110, at 
798. Of course, harmony can be further threatened if states decide to extend protections 
beyond the parameters of federal law, finding no preemption. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 31-372(a) (West Supp. 1982) (labor commissioner can prompt occupational and health 
standards "in special circumstances" where no federal standards are applicable); td. 
§ 46a-60(a)(7) (deeming as a prohibited discriminatory employment practice an em­
ployer's failure to provide reasonable means for temporary work transfers for pregnant 
women who believe continued employment in a position may cause injury to the fetus). 
140. Comment, Birtll Defecls Caused by Parenlal Exposure 10 Workplace Hazards: 
The Inleiface ofTille VII willi OSHA and TorI Law, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 237, 249 n.72 
(1979). BUI see Furnish, supra note 47, at 67. Another ambiguity might be in the general 
duty clause of the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, 29 U.S.c. § 654(a)(I) 
(1976) (employer must maintain a workplace "free from recognized hazards that are 
causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm"). See also Wright v. Olin, 
51 U.S.L.W. 2390 (4th Cir. Dec. 23, 1982) (business necessity defense in Title VII actions 
includes, under certain circumstances, fetal vulnerability program designed to protect the 
unborn children of women workers from the hazards of the workplace). 
141. 420 U.S. 575 (1975). 
142. 42 U.S.c. §§ 601-613 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
143. 420 U.S. at 576-77. 
144. Id. at 577. 
145. Id. at 580. 
146. Id. at 583 n.IO (citing Wisdom v. Norton, 507 F.2d 750, 755 (2d Cir. 1974». 
147. The program came under Title V of the Social Security Act, appearing specifi­
cally in 42 U.S.c.A. § 708(a)( I) (West Supp. 1975-1981) ("necessary health care to pro­
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although the states had an option to claim federal matching funds 
for AFDC payments to pregnant women,148 thirty-four different 
state plans under the AFDC program had been approved without 
any aid to unborn children. 149 
Given the express congressional concern with reducing "the in­
cidence of preventable diseases and handicapping conditions among 
children...,"ISO further explicit delegations of regulatory authority 
regarding the protection of the unborn are needed. For example, the 
authority to promulgate labeling requirements might be delegated so 
that consumers and others would have better access to information 
regarding the potential harm to their offspring inherent in certain 
products. lSI Also, the prohibition of certain hazardous substances 
might be broadened to include substances possessing the potential 
for significant harm to future generations of people, although they 
pose little or no threat to the present populace. IS2 
2. Child Support, Abuse and Custody Laws 
As noted, the regulation of prenatal conduct by prospective par­
ents in order to prevent birth handicaps offers differing parental per­
spectives than does the regulation of parental conduct involving 
children who have truly gained a separate biological existence. IS3 
Additionally, the public policy perspectives are different in that there 
are differing classes of people who are prospective parents,154 differ­
ing constitutional values,lss and differing health and safety consider­
ations}S6 Nonetheless, prevailing child support, abuse, and custody 
spective mothers"), and has been Changed since then, 42 U.S.c.A. §§ 701-709 (West 
Supp. 1975-1981). 
148. 420 U.S. at 579. 
149. ld. at 579-80 n.5 (citing Alcala v. Bums, 494 F.2d 743, 745 (8th Cir. 1974)). 
150. 42 U.S.C.A. § 701(a)(2) (West Supp. 1975-1981). 

15l. For example, such warnings exist regarding the use of saccarin. See also 15 

U.S.c.A. § 1333 (West 1982) (statutory, as opposed to regulatory, requirement regarding 
labeling of a dangerous product). 
152. Hazardous substances are prohibited by the Hazardous Substances Act, 15 
U.S. c.A. §§ 1261-1276 (West 1982). Consider recent debates on genetic screening of 
prospective employees. Goodrich, Are Your Genes RighIfor Your Job? 3 CAL. LAw. 24 
(1983). 
153. Supra note 113-114, and accompanying text. 
154. Conceptually, most newborns are prospective parents, as are even the unborn 
themselves. The major obstacle to regulating newborns and Ihe unborn as prospective 
parents is the lack of significant, relevant medical and scientific understanding. 
155. Born children are persons entitled to fourteenth amendment protection. while 
unborn children are not. 410 U.S. at 156-57. 
156. Handicaps which are preventable after birth differ significantly from potential 
birth handicaps preventable prior to birth. As well, the number and type of actors able to 
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laws provide much insight into the available means of preventing 
handicaps to newborns. 
There is already some precedent for the quite simple proposi­
tion that "a child conceived but not yet born [is owed a duty by a 
parent to furnish] necessary ... medical attendance or other reme-·· 
dial care."IS7 That proposition should be more universally adopted, 
with civil actions on behalf of the unborn child available to enforce 
this parental duty.1S8 Enactment of the proposition in a criminal 
code would trigger state action only after the opportunity to file civil 
proceedings has passed and when the breach of duty may have al­
ready resulted in irreparable harm to the developing fetus. 
Besides extending the parental duty to support to the furnishing 
of necessities to conceived but unborn children, laws should also 
protect the unborn from their prospective parents' abusive acts. Un­
like the duty to support, a duty to refrain from abusive acts should 
be owed by prospective parents to their unconceived, as well as con­
ceived, unborn children. Enforcement of the duty could he dele­
gated, in part, to a state health and welfare agency, which would 
possess the authority to obtain cease and desist orders with respect to 
certain conduct by prospective parents. IS9 Such enforcement would 
be facilitated by passage of mandatory reporting laws, which would 
increase the agency's access to information regarding conduct poten­
tially harmful to the unborn. Discussion of such laws has only re­
cently become worthwhile, as scientific and medical advances in the 
past few years have produced significant new insights into the link 
between prenatal conduct by prospective parents and others and 
cause a child handicaps under present scientific and medical understanding markedly 
rises and differs after the child's birth. 
157. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1982). For a construction of the statute. 
see People v. Yates, 114 Cal. App. Supp. 782, 298 P. 961 (1931). See also Malek v. 
Yekani-Fard, 51 U.S.L.W. 2356 (La. Sup. Ct. Dec. 29, 1982); In re Dodge, 9 FAM. L. 
REP. (BNA) 2165 (Kan. App. Ct. Dec. 16, 1982). 
158. Such a civil action was allowed in Kyne v. Kyne, 38 Cal. App. 2d 122, 100 
P.2d 806 (1940) (relying on the California Penal Code provision regarding furnishing of 
necessities to unborn children, as well as Civil Code provisions on establishing paternity 
and on the parental duty to SUppOI1 illegitimate children). But see Justus v. Atchison, 19 
Cal. 3d 564, 579, 565 P.2d 122, 132, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 107 (1977) (suggesting that Civil 
Code provisions on "children" might not apply to the unborn for the legislative enact­
ment does not contain "specific" intent or "appropriate terms"); In re Steven S .. 126 Cal. 
App. 3d 23, 178 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1981) (relying on the decision in Justus to find unborn 
fetus not a "person" under dependent child statute). 
159. See, e.g., In re Baby X. 97 Mich. App. 111.293 N.W.2d 736 (1980) (custody of 
newborn awarded to state based on proof of mother's prenatal treatment. wherein neglect 
was found resulting from prenatal maternal drug addiction). 
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newborns' birth hcmdicaps.l60 As further insights are gained, pre­
ventive child abuse laws may be feasible for conduct long preceding 
even the conception of the child who is to be protected from abuse. 
At times, state protection of unborn children from the abusive 
acts of their prospective parents might require assertion of custody 
over those children. Quite obviously, such assertions would also en­
tail state custody of either the prospective mother or father. There is 
precedent for such custody orders, but its scope is limited. In one 
case involving state custody of an unborn child, a woman in her last 
week of normal pregnancy had refused to undergo a caesarian sec­
tion on religious grounds}61 Without the section, there was a virtual 
certainty that the unborn child would die and a fifty percent chance 
that the woman would die; with the section, there was a virtual cer­
tainty that both the unborn child and the woman would survive. 162 
The court granted temporary custody of the fetus to a state agency 
and authorized the agency to consent to the performance of the cae­
sarian section and any other necessary medical procedures for a suc­
cessful birth. 163 In a second case involving a third trimester 
pregnancy, a court found the woman would need blood transfusions 
some time prior to delivery in order to preserve her own life and the 
life of her child. 164 Again, the woman posed religious objections, but 
again the court issued an order requiring the medical treatment 
when deemed necessary.16S These two cases are of limited scope be­
cause in both cases the judicially-ordered medical treatment would 
preserve the life of both the unborn and its mother. 
State assumption of custody of a prospective parent for the pur­
pose of protecting that parent's future offspring would also be legiti­
mate even where the parent's life is not threatened, but where the 
child's future well being, as opposed to its life, is threatened. 1M Cer­
160. Chicago Sun-Times, Jan. 20, 1983, at 28, col. I (reporting research which 
found cigarette smoke passively inhaled by a pregnant woman can harm her unborn 
baby). 
161. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 
(1981). 
162. /d. at 88, 274 S.E.2d at 459. 
163. Id., 274 S.E.2d at 459-60. 
164. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421,422­
23,201 A.2d 537, 537-38 (1964). 
165. Id., 201 A.2d at 538. 
166. Attempts at such state custody may be found in In re Steven S .. 126 Cal. App. 
3d 23. 178 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1981) (a pregnant woman in her third trimester. but with an 
"undiagnosed psychiatric illness." could not be detained on the premise that her unborn 
child was a "dependent child of the court" under the Welfare and Institutions Code, 
since the Code did not cover unborn children) and In re Dittrick Infant, 80 Mich. App. 
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tainly, the state interest would have to be compelling in cases involv­
ing pregnant women and others who have constitutionally protected 
privacy rights '67 that may be undermined even though they gain no 
physical benefits. Yet, a strong case can be made for state custody in 
a detoxification center of a pregnant woman addicted to heroin. '68 
There is also an arguable case for state custody of both males and 
females of childbearing age for the purpose of conducting genetic 
tests geared to providing information about the prospective of pre­
ventable handicaps-particularly where the tests are not very intru­
sive and where the means of prevention are available and easily 
employed. 169 
3. Procreation Laws 
The most controversial legal means of protecting newborns 
from physical and mental handicaps is the regulation of procreation 
so that certain newborns will never be born.l7° Such laws are 
founded on the premise that it is sometimes better not to be born 
than to be born. Because this premise has already served as the basis 
for certain tort l7l and criminall72 laws, it seems appropriate to ex­
219, 223, 263 N.W.2d 37, 39 (1977) (where a pregnant woman had abused an earlier 
child, Ihe Michigan Probate Code involving child custody was read not to include un­
born persons, but amendments would be desirable). For state proceedings when prenatal 
custody fails. see In re Baby X, 97 Mich. App. 111,293 N.W.2d 736 (1980). 
167. 410 U.S. at 153-53 (right to personal privacy has some extension to activities 
relating to marriage, procreation, family relationships and childrearing). 
168. Comment, The Right o/the Fetus to be Born Free ofDrug Addiction. 7 U.CD. 
L. REV. 45 (1974). 
169. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchenown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 
728.370 N.E.2d 417 (1977): Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980), 
mod. sub nom. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64. 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981). 
170. Supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
171. Turpin, 643 P.2d at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346, wherein the coun stated: 
Considering the shon life span of many of these children and their frequently 
very limited ability to perceive or enjoy the benefits of life, we cannot assen 
with confidence that in every situation there would be a societal consensus that 
life is preferable to never having been born at all ... it thus seems doubtful 
that a child's claim for general damages should properly be denied on the ra­
tionale that the value of impaired life, as a matter of law always exceeds the 
value of nonlife.... 
ld. The coun proceeded to allow a child to recover special damages for the extraordi­
nary expenses necessary to treat a hereditary ailment, where but for the defendant's neg­
ligence. the child would not have been born. ld. at 966, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 349. 
172. For example. criminal incest laws affecting competent and consenting adults. 
where the primary legal intent is to promote the well-being of the unborn by preventing 
the biological mutations that may occur. See supra note II. 
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plore how handicap prevention might be promoted through the dis­
couragement or prohibition of certain births. 
Births can be discouraged in a number of ways, including the 
creation of financial incentives and the regulation of decision-mak­
ing regarding childbirth. 173 Of course, state action cannot be unduly 
burdensome. 174 Recognition of an unborn's interest in not being 
born with severe handicaps could thus be encouraged by state 
financial support of the prospective parent's desire to abort, or to 
procure either a prenatal screening test such as amniocentesis or a 
surgical operation leading to sterility. Given the accessability of 
abortions, births of newborns with severe handicaps could also be 
discouraged by the state determination not to provide financial 
assistance to certain parents who give birth to newborns with severe 
handicaps. Regulations of decision-making regarding childbirth 
could also discourage the birth of handicapped newborns by facili­
tating access to sterilization and other forms of contraception to 
those incompetent prospective parents who' do not wish to bear such 
children. 175 
As well, births can be prohibited in a number of ways. 176 For 
example, involuntary sterilization laws prohibit the birth of 
newborns likely to suffer from certain hereditary ailments. Such a 
compulsory eugenic sterilization law was sanctioned by the Supreme 
Court of the United States over fifty years ago in Buck v. Bel/. m 
173. Parness & Pritchard, supra note 75, at 292. 
174. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 
473-74 (1977). 
175. Only a few years ago, a majority of courts held that without explicit legislative 
authorization, they lacked the power to sanction the sterilization of a mental incompe­
tent. In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235,261·62,426 A.2d 467, 480-81 (1981); In re CO.M., 627 
P.2d 607, 609-10 (Alaska 1981). A contrary trend, however, does seem to have devel­
oped. In re Moe, 385 Mass. App. Ct. 555,432 N.E.2d 712 (1982); Wentzel v. Montgom­
ery Gen. Hosp., Inc., 293 Md. 685, 447 A.2d 1244 (1982). Where judicial power has been 
recognized, the incompetent prospective parent's wishes can only be gleaned through the 
use of such tests as "best interests", In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 264, 426 A.2d 467. 482 
(1981), or "substituted judgment" In re Moe, 385 Mass. App. Cl. 555, 560. 432 N.E.2d 
712. 719-20 (1982). 
176. Consider whether prohibition of the birth of a handicapped newborn would 
be justified when the mother is clinically dead. See Chicago Sun-Times, Jan. 22,1983. at 
38. col. I (mother clinically dead for two days gave birth to premature baby, although 
doctors tried to discourage father from requesting birth as they felt baby was deformed): 
compareid.. Mar. 31,1983, at 32, col. I (woman who was brain dead for sixty-four days 
gave birth to healthy baby and then had her life support system discontinued). See also 
Dillon. Life Supporr and Maternal Brain Death During Pregnancy'. 248 J. AM. MED. A. 
1089 (1982). 
177. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). In part, the Virginia law may also have been founded on 
social need. such as sterilization to prevent the birth of a child whose parents cannot care 
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There, the Court upheld a Virginia statute which provided for the 
sexual sterilization of any mentally defective inmate of a state insti­
tution where "the health of the patient and the welfare of society" 
would be promoted. 17s The statute was applied in Buck to an eight­
een year old woman who was the daughter of a feeble-minded wo­
man, the mother of an illegitimate feeble-minded child, the probable 
potential parent of socially inadequate offspring likewise afflicted, 
and who was capable of being sterilized without detriment to her 
general health. 179 The decision in Buck continues to be regarded as. 
authority supporting the validity of compulsory eugenic sterilization 
laws, ISO although there is now dispute about some of its scientific 
findings, lSI its mode of legal analysis,182 and its view of legitimate 
governmental interests. IS3 Should more acceptable sCientific under­
standing be developed on the role heredity plays in handicaps to 
newborns, compulsory eugenic sterilization laws may again be 
fashionable. ls4 
Births of newborns with handicaps can also be prohibited 
through the passage of criminal incest laws. In Illinois, the crime of 
aggravated incest is defined as including sexual intercourse between 
any male and his blood daughter or between any female and her 
blood son, regardless of the daughter's or son's age. IS5 Because pros­
ecutions can occur even when the son or daughter is over 21 years of 
age, and thus is "sufficiently mature and autonomous to be free from 
for it. Compulsory sterilization laws founded on such social need raise even more ques­
tions than do eugenic sterilization laws. Parness & Pritchard. supra note 75. at 290-91. 
178. 274 U.S. at 205. 
179. Id. at 207. 
180. Nonh Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Nonh Carolina. 420 F. Supp. 
451 (M.D.N.C 1976) (upholding Nonh Carolina's compulsory sterilization law): In re 
Moore. 289 N.C 95,221 S.E.2d 307 (1976). See also 410 U.S. at 154 (citing Buck v. Bell. 
274 U.S. 200, 207-08 (1927), for proposition that the privacy right is not absolute). 
181. Ferster, Eliminating the Unfit-Is Sterilization the Answer?, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 
591. 619 (1966); O'Hara & Sanks, Eugenic Sterilization, 45 GEO. L.J. 20, 31. 37 (1956). 
182. See, e.g., Nonh Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Nonh Carolina. 420 
F. Supp. 451, 458 (M.D.N.C 1976) (noting that a rational basis, rather than compelling 
state interest standard was used in Buck). 
183. In re Moe, 385 Mass. App. Ct. 555, 560, 432 N.E.2d 712. 717 (1982) (state has 
no recognizable interest in compelling the sterilization of its citizens): In re Grady. 85 
N.J. 235, 246-47, 426 A.2d 467, 472-73 n.3 (1981) (finding eugenic sterilization to be 
immoral): CAL. CIVIL CODE § 43.6(a) (West 1982) ("No cause of action arises against a 
parent of a child based upon the claim that the child should not have been conceived or. 
if conceived, should not have been allowed to have been born alive"). 
184. In re A. W., 637 P.2d 366, 368-69 (Colo. 1981) (compulsory sterilization law 
would be constitutional if it funhered a compelling governmental interest-though no 
contemporary statutes were found to funher such an interest). 
185. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-10 (Smith-Hurd 1979). 
464 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:431 
undue parental pressure to submit to sexual advances,"186 biological 
risks to the offspring serve as the exclusive legitimate state interest in 
the legislation. 187 
V. CONCLUSION 
While the concentration on the legal means of securing addi­
tional rights for handicapped persons is commendable, the general 
failure to address the legal means by which handicaps in newborns 
can be prevented is unfortunate. Recent scientific and medical ad­
vances have greatly expanded the role which law can now play in 
avoiding or eliminating many potential birth handicaps. As well, 
contemporary discussion of possible legal reaction to further scien­
tific and medical advances is warranted. It should aid in expediting 
legal innovations upon the arrival of such advances and thus reduce 
the harm accruing during the traditional time lag between scientific 
and legal change. 
At the present time, laws promoting the prevention of handicaps 
to newborns are indirect, incoherent and inadequate. Laws should 
be made more direct, thereby recognizing the unborn as persons en­
titled to protection from prenatal acts likely to cause them handicaps 
at birth. Laws should be made more coherent so that when the un­
born are recognized as persons, the fullest legal protection possible is 
extended on their behalf. Finally, laws should be made more ade­
quate, extending beyond the traditional tort and criminal law areas 
into such areas as federal regulatory protection, child support, abuse 
and custody acts, and laws discouraging or prohibiting procreation. 
The time has come to discuss more fully our responsibility for our 
future childrens' health and well-being. 
186. Id. (committee comment). 
187. While cultural traditions are sometimes noted, Id.. they serve as an inappro­
priate basis. Supra note II. See also R. v. Winch. 1974 CRIM. L. REV. 487 (relying on 
the possible disastrous effects on any children). 
